Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-1987

Kierkegaard's Metatheology
Timothy P. Jackson

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Jackson, Timothy P. (1987) "Kierkegaard's Metatheology," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil1987418
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol4/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

KIERKEGAARD'S METATHEOLOGY
Timothy P. Jackson

Philosophy and theology have always been, in some measure, a matter of rewriting the
past. This can be done with more or less objectivity, more or less insight, however. Of
late. the job has not been done at all well with respect to the work of S0ren Kierkegaard.
His legacy is in danger of being coopted by modem nihilists. I argue in this paper that
Kierkegaard's understanding of truth, subjectivity, and paradox promises, in reality, a
middle way between the metaextremes of foundational ism and nihilism. He is, in this
sense, anti-modem.

Introduction

In a recent article entitled "Metaphilosophy
Harold Durfee writes.

10

the Shadow of Kierkegaard,"

Hidden in the heart of contemporary metaphilosophy, in a wide variety
of orientations. is a basic dialogue between (I) philosophers who conclude that self-authentication of reason by itself, and thus the bestowal
of its own foundations, is possible-a doctrine which Kierkegaard would
call immediacy. and (2) the more Kierkegaardian theoreticians. who
insist that the task cannot be accomplished and that any such foundation
must be "proposal-dependent," a matter of conviction. (1981:115)
Putting option (2) more boldly, some commentators have read Kierkegaard' s
equation "subjectivity is truth" as a flat denial of objective values and/or empirical
facts, the 20th Century heirs of which are various brands of nihilism. Typical
of this bold group is Stanley Rosen's lumping of Kierkegaard with Feuerbach
and Nietzsche as post-Hegelian "misologists" who merely "replace theory by
practice rather than reconciling the two" (1969:202). The technical charge of
misology is not as common as that of simple subjectivism. However, even the
high road of seeing Kierkegaard's (pseudonymous) authorship as prompted by
the complex desire to "do something nonapologetic" (Stout. 1981: 143) often
slopes imperceptibly into the low road of seeing it as prompted by the more
straightforward desire just to "create a sensation" (Fenger. 1980:35). The picture
that thus emerges is one of S. K. as romantic egoist, totally unwilling or unable
to argue for the choice of one way of life over another-a sort of "dead-end
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Werther" (see Fiedler, 1952: 183ff. and cf. MacIntyre, 1972:336-337).'
What is perhaps most striking about all such appraisals of Kierkegaard is the
fact that they persist side-by-side with directly contradictory views. In A Kierkegaard Critique, one of the earliest and best collections of relevant scholarship
in America, at least a third of the essays defend S. K. against the charge of
subjectivism or nihilism. Thus we find John Wild claiming that "[flar from being
a lapse into subjective bias and irrationalism, [S. K.' s] philosophical work is a
triumph of rational description and analysis, an original penetration of reason
into deeps of experience long languishing in the dark obscurity of the obvious"
(1967 :25). In addition, we find Gregor Malantschuk and Regin Prenter attempting
to put the widest possible intellectual distance between Kierkegaard's conception
of subjectivity and the arbitrary individualism of Nietzsche and Sartre, respectively.2 Pace all of those who would identify such phrases as "subjectivity is
truth" and "the leap of faith" with moral relativism and religious fideism, these
commentators insist that the Dane's literature preserves a place for both objectivity
and reflection in all phases of human life. A more recent scholar has even
dedicated an entire book to the thesis that "[Kierkegaard's] shifting of the style
of philosophical reflection from the theoretical to the practical did not preclude
the possibility, indeed the necessity, of developing an ontology" (Elrod, 1975: 10).
It is evident that there is a radical and rather puzzling divergence of opinion
as to the significance of Kierkegaard's authorship. The perennial either/or for
philosophical reflection generally would seem to be between some form of
dogmatism and some form of relativism, and this same dichotomy is writ small
in the matter of Kierkegaardian exegesis. The present essay is an attempt to
remedy this situation. I wish to explore the broad metalessons to be learned from
S0ren Kierkegaard's reflections on moral and intellectual excellence. In so doing,
I hope not only to contribute to his proper reading but also to isolate and defend
several claims relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology. My specific
contention is that Kierkegaard's remarks on such notions as truth, will, and
paradox suggest a middle way between the current extremes of foundational ism
and nihilism described by Durfee. This middle way combines a realist understanding of truth with an anti-foundationalist theory of knowledge, thereby
avoiding the unpalatable options commonly associated with modernism.
1. Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Fallenness

Christian theology inevitably looks to the divine perfections for human moral
ideals, conformity of the finite will to that of the infinite (agape) being the norm
of virtue for the faithful. "Ye shall be perfect even as your Father in Heaven is
perfect." Checked by its doctrine of the Fall, however, this same theology usually
insists that the ideal of perfect obedience is unattainable in this life in any pure
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form. Justification is by faith, not works-by grace, not righteousness before
the law. The law killeth, and the overly zealous (from Pelagius to John Wesley
to Sun Myung Moon) must forever be reminded that "there is none good but
the Father." Sanctification as growth in godliness is possible to an extent, but
the schooling of human eros is always and only in via. The history of Christian
theological ethics is, consequently, a sometimes tragicomic attempt to balance
the necessity for creaturely struggle and the importance of human choice with
the transcendence of the divine ideal and the ultimate impotence of human effort
alone. The Kingdom is, paradoxically, both come and coming, here and not yet.
If divinity is commonly the paradigm for finite wills and affections, it is
frequently also such for finite intellects. An emphasis on God's will (perfect
care and conduct) as the standard for human virtue is often attended by an
emphasis on God's intellect (perfect calculation and apprehension) as the standard
for human knowledge. Yet where God's intellect is the ideal, the mitigating
influence of the Fall is not as often acknowledged. Augustine and Aquinas
inveigh against the academic sceptics of their day, even as they are careful to
draw the limits of natural reason. But Spinoza seeks unabashedly to view the
world sub specie aeterni, and Hegel sums up his philosophical Lutheranism by
quoting with approval Eckhart's claim that the "eye through which we see God
is the eye through which God sees himself." The Hegelian notion of Absolute
Thought amounts to an affirmation of the possibility of realizing the intellectual
ideal in time, to an identification a La Spinoza of the human and divine minds.
It is intriguing but un surprising that the limitations imposed by the Fall (and
finitude generally) are more pronounced and better recognized in the practical
sphere than in the theoretical. Until fairly recently, decision procedures for
settling disagreements of empirical fact were commonly thought to be determinate
and fixed, at least for the natural scientist if not for the natural philosopher.
Thus, cognitive relativism was rare. The work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend,
and others has lately shaken this consensus; but even among those who concede
that both cognition and volition are involved in any judgment (empirical, ethical,
or theological), it still seems plausible to suppose that the potential for delusion
and weakness of will is far greater in moral contexts. It is not unusual (however
culpable), due either to weakness or perversity of will, to discern one's duty but
fail or refuse to act on it. This does not mean that moral truths are non-cognitive
or non-descriptive, but rather that they are descriptive and more. Both intellect
and will are implicated in most sincere moral and religious claims, in the sense
that assertions about what is right or pious or Godly imply (even pledge) appropriate behavior on the speaker's part. Many such assertions (like promises) have
the force of performatives, even if one fails to perform. Satan, to take an extreme
example, knows most of the salient realities known by the Son; but the one is
disobedient unto damnation, the other obedient unto death.
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S0ren Kierkegaard offers a corrective to the epistemic hubris of Hegel et al.
by accenting the human unattainability of the divine ideal, both intellectual and
moral. He insists that the conformity of thought and being (truth) "is actually
realized for God, but it is not realized for any existing spirit, who is himself
existentially in process of becoming" (1968:170). As object God can make
himself known for exactly who he is; as subject God can know all else for exactly
what it is. Both capacities are lacking to human beings, according to S.K. This
fidelity to the situatedness and mutability of persons does not spell the end of
epistemic realism however. The nature of truth remains for Kierkegaard (and
his pseudonyms) correspondence between subject and object, even if its know ability becomes uncertain .
. . . the notion of the truth as identity of thought and being is a chimera
of abstraction, in its truth only an expectation of the creature; not because
the truth is not such an identity, but because the knower is an existing
individual for whom the truth cannot be such an identity as long as he
lives in time. (1968: 176) lemphasis mine]
Truth remains an ideal, an"expectation," however approximate its realization
must forever be for the creature.
One of the most important yet elusive distinctions in S. K. is that between
"accidental" (i. e., empirico-historical) know ledge and "essential" (i. e., ethicoreligious) knowledge. The former may be communicated directly and is altogether
"disinterested," while the latter may be communicated indirectly and is understood
personally in the "passion of inwardness." The wedge Kierkegaard seeks to drive
between these two types is not as wide as he imagines. All knowledge is more
or less interested. To argue for this conclusion, however, is not yet to appreciate
his positive contributions to epistemology. It remains to see what is right with
his analysis of essential knowledge, taking care to note that such insight will in
fact be applicable to all human knowledge.
Kierkegaard in the person of Johannes Climacus is notorious for contending
that "subjectivity is truth" or "essential knowledge is subjective." This formula
has been much misunderstood. The key to interpreting it aright, I believe, is to
read it as an analogy of attribution. An analogy of attribution involves either
ascribing a property to something or identifying an object with it, because that
something is either a sign or a cause of the property or object. Examples include
saying that "clear urine is healthy" because clear urine is a sign of health in a
person, and saying that "God is my life" because God is the cause of one's life.
To think that urine is literally the subject of health or that the Deity is identical
with one person's temporal existence is to blunder badly. Similarly, S. K.'s
phrase. "subjectivity is truth" is to be seen as an epistemological thesis about
how we test or discern truth claims (passion), not as a definition of truth. Rosen
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(1969) and Macintyre (1972) notwithstanding, it is most definitely not a romantic
denial of objective moral and religious truth. The epistemic significance of
passion (passion-as-sign) is evident in this passage from the Postscript: "The
subjective reflection turns its attention inwardly to the subject, and desires in
this intensification of inwardness to realize the truth" (1968: \75). While the
ontological or etiological role of passion (passion-as-cause) is apparent in lines
like these: " ... the spiritual relationship to God in the truth, i.e. in inwardness,
is conditional by a prior irruption of inwardness" (219). Failure to appreciate
the analogical usage leads to the exegetical confusion adumbrated in my Introduction.
On page 181 of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus writes, "The
objective accent fails on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it is
said." And again, "Only in subjectivity is there decisiveness, to seek objectivity
is to be in error. It is the passion of the infinite that is the decisive factor and
not its content, for its content is precisely itself. In this manner subjectivity and
the subjective 'how' constitute the truth." These remarks may indeed seem to
commit the McLuhanesque fallacy of identifying the message with its medium,
of confusing the sign with the thing signified; and if this is so, the consequences
for ethics and theology are precisely as misological as some commentators have
feared. There is a plausible understanding of even these "hard sayings" which
avoids such extremes, however, and which leaves Kierkegaard's ethico-religious
realism intact. In this case the key is to be found, in large part, in the distinction
between a sign and a symbol.
2. Reality, Belief, and Doubt
The peculiarity of essential knowledge is that it is reflexive, hence passionate
inwardness is inseparable from ethico-religious truth in two ways. First, as I
have suggested, passion is an epistemic prerequisite for the apprehension of
moral and religious facts. In Either/Or, for instance, the subjective decision to
comport oneself as if there were a God and real values is seen as a necessary
condition for the objective discovery that there is infac! a God and real values.'
Passion is an enabling condition-what I earlier called a "cause"--of insight,
thus in the Journals Kierkegaard calls subjectivity "the way of deliverance."
Second, inwardness is not only the how but also part of the what of essential
truth, in that passion is itself a value and a participation in the life of the divine.
. . . truly relating to truth means that all the inner and the outer garments
of illusion have to be discarded, and you are brought into touch with
truth so that this truth itself becomes your very own existential truth.
(l975b:364)
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Human subjectivity is a sign which participates in the reality toward which it
points-that is to say, a symbol. 4 The passionate inwardness of faith is the
essential point of intersection between time and eternity; so if you have not faith,
for you there is no God. But, according to Johannes Climacus, "within the
individual man there is a potentiality (man is potentially spirit) which is awakened
in inwardness to become a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible to
see God everywhere" (1968:220-221). Anything created can become a symbol
for the Creator, but lest we be guilty of the Hegelian lapse we must concede
that, however intimate the communion, human faith constitutes a relationship
not an identity with the Deity. The task is to become subjective, but "[t]he most
any man has ever achieved in this respect can serve [only] as an infinitely faint
analogy to intimate how God is infinite subjectivity" (l975b:363). Just so, "God
cannot be the highest superlative of the human: he is qualitatively different"
(1967b:30) .
The pathos of human existence is that the objects of observation, evaluation,
and meditation are all, finally, removed from human subjects. According to
Johannes Climacus in De Omnibus Dubitandum Est(l967a), the two facets within
the consciousness of reality are the immediate objects in the world and the
immediacy of sensation and cognition. These two cannot be distinguished within
immediacy itself; they may only be posited when "ideality" is contrasted with
"objectivity." A consciousness in immediacy is unaware of the possibility of its
being in error about the world, because there is no self to be in error. Everything
is real and actual for this immediacy. In objectivity alone there can be no doubt,
for doubt implies a recognition of the possibility of suspending immediacy by
contrasting thought with being, which, in tum, opens the way for a contrast
between subject and object. Only when there is a distinction between myself
and the world within self-consciousness can there be a question of the discrepancy
between the world and my perception of or reaction to it. Only when the contrast
between the world as objects and speech as words enters into consciousness, for
example, does knowledge appear as a problem and scepticism appear as a possibility.
When this opposition is recognized, there is a tendency to alternate between
a realist epistemology, in which one's task is to bring thought and action into
conformity with realties in the world, and an idealist epistemology, in which
thought is seen as the sole arbiter of both reality and truth. On the realist view,
one's perception of the world, which exists independently of this perception, is
only reliable to the extent that it prevents prejudice and sloth from distorting
objects in it. On the idealist view, the world is only conceivable as a thought
and the objectivity of the world is (at most) a necessary construction. 5
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The alternation between an emphasis upon reality and an emphasis upon
ideality as the measure of truth can also lead to an alternation between foundationalism (or pure objectivity) and nihilism (or pure subjectivity), yet both
extremes forget that consciousness is an opposition which must be mediated.
They forget, according to Climacus, that self-consciousness is a third element
relating the two opposing terms reality and ideality, object and subject. "Reality
is not consciousness, any more than ideality is. And yet consciousness is not
present without both, and this opposition or contradiction between reality and
ideality is the origin and essence of consciousness" (1967a: 149-150). By recognizing the inadequacy of any theory of knowledge that claims to overcome the
tension between reality and ideality (e.g., naive realism or Hegelian idealism),
one advances to a higher level of self-consciousness. But this "potentiation" of
consciousness does not erase the tension from view; it insists on keeping it before
one's eyes. Thought and reality are only seen as an opposition (a "collision")
from the perspective of self-consciousness. Even "reflection" is not itself aware
of the need to bring thought and the world into relation within knowledge or to
bring evaluation and the world into relation via action. It is a disinterested
awareness of the possibility, what Climacus refers to as an "aesthetic" attitude.
Self-consciousness, in contrast, is characterized by "concern."
Foundationalism as complete objectivity hands consciousness over to something inhuman and abstract by forgetting about the subjective features of human
nature, such as will and emotion. Nihilism as complete subjectivity leads to
aestheticism, however refined and Faustian. Both foundationalism and nihilism
are evasions of the demand of self-consciousness "to acquire the Truth [God]"
(1974:17). Foundationalism's excess is to read the nature of knowledge as
demanding a sure test; nihilism's excess is to read the impossibility of a sure
test as implying the nonsensicality of anything objective to test for, anything
real to believe in. Both are attempts to eliminate the possibility of doubt by
eliminating the subject/object distinction. Belief requires the possibility of doubt,
however, and only a believer (in whatever) can be a philalethist, a lover of truth.
Love of truth is a passion which must be cultivated, and it is as much a mistake
to consider subjectivity superfluous to piety as it is to consider it the (chief)
object of piety.
Ethical and religious questions call for passionate choice, but the choice is
not arbitrary. Kierkegaard is a realist with regard to ethico-religious truth and a
fallibilist with regard to ethico-religious justification; his introduction of volition
and emotion into the equation (e.g., Journals, 1975b: 351-352) does not spell
the loss of objective norms for right behavior. He clearly' believes that feelings
can be intentional, having objects (such as God's will) just as other modes of
perception do, although he insists contra Hegel that in all varieties of human
knowledge (save perhaps logic and mathematics) there is less that absolute
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certainty and the perpetual possibility of self-deception and/or weakness of will.
At least one modern philosopher (Bambrough, 1979: 112-116) has noted that
there can be weakness of will in both the theoretical and the practical domains,
and Kierkegaard would surely have agreed with him that such phenomena presuppose the objectivity of both the physical world and the world of God and
values-as well as human freedom. Kierkegaard certainly considered ethicoreligious matters to constitute a more pressing personal concern than empirical
science (1968:305), and he at times overdrew the contrast with historical knowledge; but the larger lesson to be learned is that "De gustibus non disputandum"
is no more applicable to ethics or theology than "De omnibus dubitandum est"
is applicable to epistemology. S. K.' s own best insight is that in any objective
discipline (empirical, moral, theological) both the intellect and the will must be
schooled by a reality beyond the individual subject.

3. On Paradoxes
For Kierkegaard the objective correlate of the formulation "subjectivity is
truth"-the other side of the coin, as it were-is the doctrine of "the Paradox."
Not without some justification, this doctrine has also been seen as grist for the
mills of those commentators (e.g., Allison, 1972:302) who wish to characterize
either him or his pseudonyms as misologist, as irrationalist. It is not difficult to
find passages from the Postscript in which Climacus, not himself a Christian,
suggests that for the believer the eternal is in itself "absurd" (1968: 188), that
"[ w]ith the understanding directly opposed to it, the inwardness of faith must
lay hold of the paradox" (201). Here again, however, the story is far from simple.
In the Postscript the pseudonym criticizes, lampoons, even corrects speculative
philosophy's "understanding" of Christianity as a piece of objective knowledge,
insisting that "in connection with the absolute paradox the only understanding
possible is that it cannot be understood" (195). None of this translates into
anti-rationalism necessarily. Kierkegaard in propria persona offers this revealing
gloss on his own work:
What I usually express by saying that Christianity consists of paradox,
philosophy in mediation, Leibniz expresses by distinguishing between
what is above reason and what is against reason. Faith is above reason.
By reason he understands, as he says many places, a linking together
of truths (enchainement), a conclusion from causes. Faith therefore
cannot be proved, demonstrated, comprehended, for the link which
makes a linking together possible is missing, and what else does this
say than that it is a paradox. This, precisely, is the irregularity in the
paradox, continuity is lacking, or at any rate it has continuity only in
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reverse, that is, at the beginning it does not manifest itself as continuity.
(l975a:399-400) [first and last emphases mine J

One obvious way of better understanding (if not reconciling) the lines I have
quoted is to examine more fully the various senses that can be assigned to the
word "paradox." I propose to do so in this section, availing myself of distinctions
noted by W. V. O. Quine. Quine distinguishes between three types of paradox,
labelled "veridical," "falsidical," and "antinomica!." A veridical paradox is
"truth-telling" in that it can be interpreted as showing rightly (though in a way
which surprises us) either that something is possible or that it is impossible. The
paradox that Frederic in 'The Pirates of Penzance" can be twenty-one years old
having passed only five birthdays, for example, reminds us, upon analyzing it,
that it is possible to be born on February 29th and therefore celebrate a birthday
less often than once a year. And the paradox that a village barber who shaves
all and only those men in his village who do not shave themselves in tum shaves
himself if and only if he does not shave himself, convinces us, upon analyzing
it, that it is impossible for there actually to be such a barber. Both of these
paradoxes are veridical and conclusive, according to Quine; each demonstrates
an unusual truth and in this sense only is "paradoxical."
A falsidical paradox, on the other hand, is not truth-telling but false. It is
simply an argument or putative proof which is particularly opaque as to its
erroneousness but which, nonetheless, involves a fallacious step and a false
conclusion. An example from this category would be the paradox of Zeno purporting to show that it is impossible for Achilles to pass the tortoise, no matter
how slowly it moves. just so long as it keeps moving. Zeno's argument has
three basic steps:
Premise 1: By the time Achilles gets from where he was at time t to a
point n where the tortoise was at time t, additional time will have elapsed
and so the tortoise will now be at a point beyond n, namely n +
(tortoise's velocity· «t+l)-t)). Call this new point n+1.
Premise 2: Since there will again be a lapse of time between when
Achilles leaves n and when he arrives at n+ 1 (and indeed between
when he leaves any point and when he arrives elsewhere), it will take
an eternity for him to catch the tortoise.
Conclusion: It is impossible for Achilles (a faster runner) to overtake
the tortoise (a slower runner), just so long as the latter keeps moving.
This argument is falsidical, in Quine's estimation, because of its "mistaken
notion that an infinite succession of intervals of time has to add up to all eternity"
(1977:3). Because of the modem principle that an infinite succession of succeedingly shorter intervals need not add up to an infinite period, the first two steps
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of the argument do not support the absurd (and false) conclusion that one runner
can never overtake another. As Quine puts it, this is merely a matter of "convergent series."
Quine's third category, that of the antinomies, is perhaps the most interesting.
Antinomies are so intriguing because they "produce a self-contradiction by
accepted ways of reasoning" (5). Take Grelling's paradox: if an adjective is said
to be "autological" when it applies to itself (such as "short," "English," and
"polysyllabic") and "heterological" when it does not (such as "long," "German,"
and "monosyllabic"), then one is at a loss when asked which kind of adjective
"heterological" itself is. If it is autological, then it is true of itself, which makes
it heterological; and if it is heterological, then it is not true of itself, which makes
it autological. This is clearly a contradiction, but there does not seem to be a
way of escaping it similar to that found in veridical or falsidical contexts. We
cannot deny the existence of the adjective "heterological" as we denied the
existence of the village barber: we have just gotten through defining precisely
this adjective. And neither do we seem to be able to cite a fallacious step in the
move to contradiction, as we did in Zeno's Achilles/tortoise case. Thus, Grelling's
is a paradox of a uniquely troubling sort: it indicates radical surgery.
In Quine's opinion, rationality dictates that we first isolate the principle of
thought that is to blame for this contradiction and then either remove it or check
its malignancy. What is the offending principle in the above antinomy?-nothing
less than that an adjective "x" is true of a thing y if and only if y is x. This
notion seems entirely basic and incontrovertible, but Quine maintains that if we
are to escape the difficulties that arise when "heterological," "not true of itself,"
and similar locutions are substituted for "x," then we must no longer countenance
the application of the phrase "true of' to itself. Such a self-referential application
is to be considered meaningless because not either true or false, and with this
semantic reform Grelling's paradox disappears. It makes no sense either to affirm
or deny that "heterological" is itself heterological. Under the new dispensation
we can now reclassify what was formerly a genuine antinomy as a falsidical
paradox, even as developments in mathematics allowed our recent forefathers
to reclassify the notorious puzzles which to Zeno were beyond solving. Thus
far Quine.
How might Quine's analysis illuminate Kierkegaard's comments on paradox?
One possibility is that we see the pseudonyms contemplating Christianity as akin
to Zenos contemplating the Achilles/tortoise example. On this scenario, Christ
as the God-man would be for Johannes Climacus a flat contradiction, a genuine
antinomy that cannot be explained away by any rational principles, something
against reason. The problem with this view, however, is that it suggests that a
non-pseudonymous perspective would see that the God-man is afalsidical paradox. It suggests that the Hegelian philosopher, say, can discern the fallacious
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step in the argument to antinomy. This does not accord with S. K. 's Journal
remark quoted earlier that the paradox of faith has "continuity in reverse." The
more plausible reading, I believe, is to identify the pseudonyms with individuals
who are mystified by a veridical paradox. Quine does not explicitly allow for
the possibility of epistemological developments leading us to recognize that what
was formerly a genuine antinomy (i.e., insoluble or incomprehensible) is actually
truth-telling, but nothing in his analysis rules this out. And what else can Kierkegaard mean by his reference to "continuity in reverse" than that the believer's
perspective posterior to the leap of faith permits him or her to see the complex
way in which Christ is, in fact, both human and divine? The agnostic pseudonyms
can carry rational analysis to its limits and still be faced with a contradiction
inexplicable on the basis of recognized principles. S. K. 's point as a Christian
author, however, is that there is a faculty supra rationem: inwardness. Quine
confines himself to developments in epistemology that are cognitive (e.g., the
recognition of leap year day or the idea of convergent series); but, as I indicated
in the preceding section, Kierkegaard is convinced that some such developments
are subjective (e.g., passion).
Kierkegaard's contention is not that there is no perspective from which Christianity escapes self-contradiction, but rather that there is no rational (i.e., discursively articulable) perspective. Once passion and volition are given their epistemic
due as disclosers of ethico-religious truth, it becomes clear that faith does not
violate the intellect but rather sets it aside or supersedes it. "All Problemata
should end as follows: This is the paradox of faith, a paradox which no reasoning
is able to master-and yet it is so ... " (1 975a:402; emphasis mine). Pace
Santurri (1977), Kierkegaardian faith does not believe in what it knows to be a
self-contradiction; a self-contradiction is necessarily false, so to believe it true
would be misologism indeed. In what must be a self-conscious inversion of
Kant, Kierkegaardian faith embraces in passionate inwardness what reason alone
is unable to demonstrate is not a genuine antinomy. Reason is not contradicted,
but neither is it given the last word. Even if the leap is a move into the silence
of Abraham before Sarah, Eleazar, and Isaac, it is also a move into relationship
with God, the Word. In his Journals, S. K. drives the salient point home:
The divine paradox is that [Christ] became noticed, if in no other way
than by being crucified, that he performed miracles and the like, which
means that he still was recognized by his divine authority, even though
it demanded faith to solve its paradox. .. . (l975a:401)
Faith "solves" the paradox of Christianity, though the solution outstrips the
powers of objective reflection.
Kierkegaard's position is often associated with that of Tertullian, the dictum
"Credo quia absurdum" being cited in support. It is doubtful that Tertullian

82

Faith and Philosophy

actually ever said this, but if my application of Quinean categories to Danish
catechetics has been appropriate, I may conclude this section by exploring the
senses in which the quoted phrase is or is not Kierkegaardian. "Credo quia
absurdum" is usually translated "I believe because it is absurd," but more must
be said of the connective "quia" ("because") if the expression is to be fully
understood. "Quia" may be identified either with the "because" of logical or
moral justification, or with the "because" of causal explanation. The first usage
is represented by such statements as "It must be Smith's car because Johnson
owns a Ford" and "We should feed the hungry because their plight is partly our
doing." Examples of the second include "The car exploded because it was struck
from behind" and "I stepped on the cat because I was trying, awkwardly, to
avoid stepping on the dog." If the "because" in "I believe because it is absurd"
is construed as a justificatory connective, then the entire comment is irrational,
and Kierkegaard' s position cannot be identified with it. If the "because" is causal,
however, then the comment has the force of ''The absurdity accounts for why
there is belief and not something else, e.g., knowledge," and Kierkegaard's view
is quite compatible with it. Whatever Father Tertullian's sentiments might have
been in this matter, in no case may S. K. be made guilty of misologism by
association. His leap of faith is not rationally justified by an appeal to the paradox,
though it may be partly explained.
Conclusion: Kierkegaard's Scepticism
S16ren Kierkegaard insisted that he was indebted to Kant for demonstrating
once and for all that thought and being (ideality and reality) are distinct (see
Croxall, 1967:29). He thus recognized that at the meta-level scepticism prevails,
but he also recognized that one cannot live on the meta-level. Kierkegaard saw
that one must act on what one believes to be true, although (1) there is no sure
test for it, at least not in the moral and religious spheres, and although (2) even
the best of current beliefs is not constitutive of truth. (1) is an epistemological
insight contra Kant (contra, e.g., the categorical imperative, as commonly understood), and (2) is an alethiological insight contra Hegel (i.e., his historicism).
Richard Rorty has remarked that Hegel kept Kant's epistemology (of given and
interpretation, receptivity and spontaneity) but tried to let go of the thing-in-itself,
thus making idealism a patsy for dogmatic realist reactions emphasizing truth as
correspondence (see 1982:16). Kierkegaard can be understood to have kept the
thing-in-itself but to have let go of the foundational Kantian epistemology, thus
preserving realism-but realism without dogmatism, truth without a priori certainty. He recognized that irony, humor, and conviction all depend on the presumption that there are objective realities (empirical, moral, and religious). (We
cannot be enlightened by fiction if there is no such thing as fact; we cannot
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laugh at human folly if there is no such thing as human faithfulness.) But he
also viewed the notion of a fully completed ontology as merely comical.
Those who would charge S. K. or his pseudonyms with irrationalism must
reckon with the following representative passage from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
That thought has validity was assumed by Greek philosophy without
question. By reflecting over the matter one would have to arrive at the
same result; but why confuse the validity of thought with reality? A
valid thought is a possibility, and every further question as to whether
it is real or not should be dismissed as irrelevant. (1968:292)
A clearer endorsement of what might be called "sceptical realism" is difficult
to imagine. The essential ingredient leaps off the page: the denial of dogmatism
(and idealism is a kind of dogmatism) coupled with the avoidance of nihilism.
In such works as Repetition and Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard highlights
further the epistemic import of passion and imagination, as well as the correlative
absence of incorrigible or mechanical means of making critical personal choices;
but in the lines quoted above and throughout his authorship he both gives reason
its due and scrupulously distinguishes between thought and reality, between
knowledge claims and truth. Persistent misreadings on this score suggest, ultimately, either no ears to hear or an intentional will-to-disbelieve. In any case,
the rather humble conclusion that "a valid thought is possible" contains an
essential philosophical insight; the modem exponents of nihilism, in rejecting
this insight, are not Kierkegaardian-whatever else they might be. 6
Yale University

NOTES
I. Even those like Roger Gottlieb who recognize that Kierkegaard was not technically an emotivistin as much as he did not reduce ethical norms to feelings or desires-still find it difficult to reconcile
his emphasis on individual choice with his apparent suggestion that there can be "mistakes" in the
subjective life (see 1978:490-492).
2. Additional analyses of Kierkegaard along these lines can be found in pieces by James Collins
(1967:148), Cornelio Fabro (1967:160), N. H. S0e (1967:209), and Valter Lindstr0m (1967:234).
3. Kierkegaard's pseudonym writes,
If you will understand me aright, I should like to say that in making a choice it is not so much
a question of choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one
chooses. Thereby the personality announces its inner infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is consolidated. Therefore, even if a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless
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discover, precisely by reason of the energy by which he chose, that he had chosen the wrong.
For the choice being made with the whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is purified
and he himself brought into immediate relation to the external Power whose omnipresence
interpenetrates the whole of existence. (1972b: 171)

Notice that the passage preserves the key distinctions between right and wrong and between the
subject and the object of volition.
4. Cf. Paul Tillich (1958). On my view, all symbols are signs but not all signs are symbols.
5. This alteration generates what Hegel calls in the Phenomenology of Mind (1967) the various
forms of "natural consciousness," which follow upon the loss of "sense certainty."
6. I am thinking here particularly of Richard Rorty, who too quickly appropriates Kierkegaard as
one of his "heroes." See (1979:passim, but especially 377, note #29). For recent deconstructionist
treatments of S. K., see Mark Taylor (1982) and Christopher Norris (1983). Of the two, Norris is
more straightforward in acknowledging that he offers a reading "actively pre-empted by much of
what Kierkegaard wrote" (1983:85).
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